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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgments and decisions of the Utah 
Court of Appeals generally and over the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in this 
matter, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(a) (2001 as Amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue preserved by the Utah Supreme Court in its Order, dated April 27, 
2007, granting the Petitioner's request for a Writ of Certiorari, is whether the court of 
appeals erred in its assessment of the parol evidence rule in Tangren Family Trust ex rel 
Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 180 (Utah App., 2006). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard applied by the supreme court is well established. "On certiorari review, 
1 
[the supreme court] reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the 
district court." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007). Whether the 
court of appeals erred in its assessment of the parol evidence rule presents a question of law 
that the supreme court reviews for correctness. 'The correctness of the court of appeals' 
decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review.'" State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah52002); State v. Visser, 
22 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2000). 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 29,2006, has been designated 
as Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 180 (Utah App.,2006). A 
copy of the decision is attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 " to the Addendum. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling or determinative constitutional and/or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The claims of the parties in this action are centered around the validity of a Lease 
Agreement executed by the parties. Each of the parties hereto brought claims against the 
other party relevant to the validity, interpretation, enforcement and breach of the Lease 
Agreement and for damages and other relief associated with the interaction of the parties 
2 
under the terms thereof. The Respondent/Appellee maintained that the Lease Agreement 
(executed two times by the parties) was a viable enforceable integrated contract. The 
Petitioner/Appellant contended that the Lease Agreement was invalid, based upon extrinsic 
parol evidence. The trial court, without a jury, determined that the Lease Agreement was 
invalid and denied any further relief to the parties on their respective claims. 
The Court of Appeals determined that the parties entered into a valid, integrated, and 
unambiguous lease agreement and that the trial court's findings were insufficient as to a 
determination of breach. Based thereon, the matter was reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with the appellate court's decision. 
In response to the Appellant's Petition for a writ of Certiorari, this Court entered an 
order dated April 27, 2007, granting the petition as to only one of the three grounds urged 
by the Appellant. This Court ordered that it would review the matter only as to the 
application of the parole evidence rule to the facts of this case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The case was tried to the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, sitting without a jury. At trial, the court considered extrinsic evidence concerning the 
intent of the parties in creating the lease agreement. (A copy of the Lease Agreement is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "2.") The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was in 
default, or in the alternative, that the lease was created only to protect Defendant's interest 
from the other Tangren Family Trust beneficiaries should the Plaintiff, Richard Tangren pass 
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away. Further, the Plaintiff Richard Tangren testified that the lease was not to be recorded 
prior to his death. The Defendant claimed that the parties intended the lease to be an 
enforceable contract and that he and the Plaintiff had acted in conformity thereof and that the 
Defendant had committed no breach. 
At the end of a three-day bench trial, the trial court issued a finding invalidating the 
lease. The court found that the lease was created only to prevent the Defendant's siblings 
from encroaching on Defendant's investment and that the lease was not intended to govern 
the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The trial court accordingly ordered 
the Defendant off the land controlled by the lease and ordered the timely removal of the 
Defendant's personal property. 
The Court of Appeals panel hearing Defendant's appeal unanimously held, based 
upon the facts of the case, that the presumption accompanying the lease agreement's 
integration clause, the purpose of which was to preclude the subsequent introduction of 
evidence of preliminary negotiations or side agreements, was not, overcome by the Plaintiff 
Richard Tangren's self-serving testimony that it was not intended to govern his relationship 
with the Defendant. The Court of Appeals having determined that the lease was an 
integrated agreement, then examined the facts of the case to determine the existence of an 
ambiguity (which would have afforded an independent basis for the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence). The court noted that neither of the parties contended that there were ambiguities 
and found by its examination, that there were none. 
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Based upon a finding and conclusion that the agreement was integrated and 
unambiguous, the Court of Appeals panel found that the trial court improperly allowed 
Plaintiffs testimony to modify the terms of the lease. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the key facts in the under lying case. 
A. The Acquisition of the Land Described in the Lease by the Tangren 
Family Trust. 
Richard L. Tangren, the trustee of the Plaintiff trust, acquired title to the 135 acres 
of unimproved property and placed it in the Tangren Family Trust (Tr. Vol. 1, 21:11-20). 
Richard Tangren is the trustee of the trust and the Tangren children, including the Defendant, 
are the beneficiaries (Tr. Vol. 1, 247:15 to 249:4). 
B. Building and Construction on the Trust Property. 
The Tangrens decided to build a house-lodge structure on the land. (Tr. Vol. 1,22:1-
13). A building with a basement that had been blasted out of the rock was constructed with 
connecting tunnels, to be used for storage or guest accommodations. Other improvements 
included a double horseshoe pit (Tr. Vol. 1, 28:16-18), a tennis court (Tr. Vol. 1, 30:2-10; 
Exhibit 10), baseball diamond court (Tr. Vol. 1, 39:11-20; Exhibit 15), shooting range (Tr. 
Vol. 1, 40:2-12; Exhibit 16), an airplane runway (Tr. Vol 1, 41:11-25; Exhibit 17), corral 
and storage areas (Tr. Vol. 1, 43:18-23; Exhibit 18), and a water tank (Tr. Vol. 1,44:1-22). 
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The obvious impediments to actual operation of the ranch, as opposed to use as a 
campground, included the lack of running water, electricity and the lack of facilities to cook 
and feed guests (Tr. Vol. 1, 188:11-15; Tr. Vol. 2, 27:1 to 29:17). 
C. Background and Execution of the Lease Agreement 
Of all his children, Richard Tangren testified that the Defendant Rodney Tangren was 
the only child that had showed a significant interest in the ranch and was the one that spent 
a "lion's share" of the time at the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 112:14 to 133:7;Tr. Vol. 2, 72:16-24). 
Richard Tangren enlisted the help of the Defendant to turn the land into a commercially 
viable dude ranch. To do so the Plaintiff kept the Defendant on the payroll of Plaintiff s 
fencing company while the Defendant worked on the property. 
Richard Tangren testified that around 1992, someone was needed to oversee the 
Tangren ranch and he wanted the Defendant to take the job (Tr. Vol. 1,51:20-25). However, 
the Defendant, Rodney Tangren, in order to quit his work in fencing, wanted some kind of 
protection against claims of his six siblings under the trust and to protect the time and money 
he was investing in the land (Tr. Vol. 1, 52:1-18; Tr. Vol. 2, 73:10-15). In response to the 
concerns of the Defendant, Richard Tangren, as the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust, had an 
extended term lease (Addendum, Exhibit "2"), drafted by his attorneys. (Tr. Vol. 2, 76:10-
17). Under the terms of the lease, Plaintiff leased the land to the Defendant for a period 
of ninety-nine years. (Tr. Vol. 2, 85:4 to 87:15). 
D. The Lease Agreement 
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The lease was re-executed in 1994 with the only difference being the deletion of the 
Defendant's wife as a named lessee. The lease required the Defendant to pay Plaintiff $275 
per month which covered rent, taxes and insurance. (Tr. Vol. 1, 97:13 to 103:25; 110:1-9; 
114:25 to 116:3; 116:15-25; Exhibit 23). Defendant recorded the lease in 2001, after the 
relationship with the Plaintiff soured. Id. Both leases had the same integration clause that 
stated that the lease contained "the entire understanding between the parties with respect to 
its subject-matter, the [land] and all aspects of the relationship between Lessee and Lessor." 
E. Events After the Execution of the Lease Agreement 
The Defendant testified that Richard had interfered with the lease and improperly 
interrupted his use of the property described in the lease by building sheds, moving junk to 
the ranch, removing water tanks, taking a cutoff saw, damaging aircraft wind sock, and, 
taking a compressor and trailers. (Tr. Vol. 2,171:3 to 184:6; 188:13 to 198:25; Exhibits 73, 
74, 75, 7, 77 and 78 ). By 2002, the relationship between the parties had severely 
deteriorated resulting in claims by both parties of breach of the lease agreement. To counter 
the contention of the Defendant that the Plaintiff was interfering with the Defendant's rights 
under the lease, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant was in breach for failure to pay the 
agreed rent. There was testimony of money invested in the property that was accepted as 
rent and evidence of the payment of rent by checks that the Plaintiff never submitted to the 
bank for payment. (Tr. Vol. 1, 74:14 to 81:11; 126:18 to 127:3;Tr. Vol. 2, 78:22 to 79:15). 
Defendant prepared and tendered the check for $18,775 dated 3/25/2002 (Exhibit 29)(Tr. 
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Vol. 2, 7:6 to 8:16). The$18,775 delinquent figure was arrived at from a default notice sent 
by Plaintiffs attorney acknowledging that the total rent due through March, 2002 was 
$23,925 having offset the tendered payments of $4,950.00 (Tr. Vol. 2, 54:18 to 55:18, 
Exhibit 41). Ultimately, the Plaintiffs filed the present action to which the Defendant 
answered and counterclaimed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Lease Agreement executed by the parties (Addendum No. "2"), has all the 
necessary components in the document to be a valid, binding and enforceable contract. The 
Lease Agreement was a fully integrated and unambiguous contract and accordingly parol 
evidence was not admissible with regard to the same. The Lease Agreement, as drafted, 
enjoyed a presumption of "integration" that was found by the Appellate Court to have 
survived the self serving testimony of the Plaintiff. 
The application of the parol evidence rule and the exceptions thereto was applied by 
the court of appeals in keeping with long standing precedent of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY ASSESSED AND APPLIED THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Basis of the Court of Appeal's Application of the Parol 
Evidence Rule is Clearly set out in its Decision. 
In response to the Defendant's claim that the trial court had impermissibly considered 
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parol evidence to invalidate an unambiguous and integrated lease, the court of appeals noted 
that, "[i]n the absence of fraud, the parol evidence rule excludes "contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations, offered for the purpose of varying or adding 
to the terms of an integrated contract." Tangren Family Trust ex rel Tangren v. Tangren, 
154 P.3d 180, 182 (Utah App.,2006) (citing Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 
(Utah 1985)). The court of appeals noted that the application of the parol evidence rule 
involved two steps. First, the court must consider whether the agreement is integrated. If the 
court finds that the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if the 
court makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement is ambiguous. 
Id. (citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1995)). 
The court of appeals noted that any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is admissible 
in the preliminary determination of integration; however, the court stated, that courts must 
"apply a rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated 
agreement is what it appears to be." Union Bank 707 P.2d at 665. 
Although recognizing that the question of integration is a question of fact for which 
the trial court may consider any relevant evidence, Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. 
Tangren, 154 P.3d 180, 182 (Utah App.,2006), the court of appeals held that the party 
challenging the application of the parol evidence rule must overcome the presumption that 
a "writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to be." 
Union Bank, 101 P.2d at 665. The court of appeals noted that the lease agreement in this 
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case, which was executed by the parties twice on two separate occasions included an 
integration clause titled "Entire Agreement," which stated that the Lease contained the entire 
understanding between the parties with respect to the land and to the lessor-lessee 
relationship. The court of appeals relied on language composed by this Court in discussing 
the importance of the integration clause: 
[Integration] clauses are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal 
to the courts that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered 
completely integrated.... [T]he purpose and effect of including [an integration] 
clause is to preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets 
the document. Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, % 
28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Id. 
The court noted that the record reflected that the Plaintiff worked closely with his 
attorneys during the drafting of the Lease. The evidence established that the Plaintiff went 
against his attorneys1 advice in altering some of the terms of the Lease after it was drafted 
and prior to having Defendant sign, including the unusually long term of the Lease and the 
low monthly rental payment schedule. In both the 1992 lease and the 1994 lease, Plaintiff 
included the same integration clause. 
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The court observed that at trial, the Plaintiff testified that he intended the Lease to 
become effective only to protect Defendant from his siblings in the event of Plaintiff s death. 
The court noted that the testimony was the sole evidence on which the trial court could have 
based its ruling that the Lease was invalid. The court then applied the long established 
preference for gleaning the intent of contracting parties, "whenever possible, from written 
documents rather than from self-serving testimony." Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley, 27 
P.3d 565 (Utah App. 2001); see also Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1999). The 
court held that, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff had not overcome the presumption of 
integration. Tangren Family Trust ex rel Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 180, 182 (Utah 
App.,2006) (citing Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665). 
The court held that the lease in question contained a clear and unambiguous 
integration clause, the purpose of which is to "preclude the subsequent introduction of 
evidence of preliminary negotiations or of side agreements." Id. (citing Ford, supra at 98 
P.3d 15). The court of appeals continued that while the trial court could consider Plaintiffs 
testimony regarding his intent in creating the Lease, the court erred in relying on that 
testimony in the face of a clear and unambiguous integration clause in the Lease itself. Id. 
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's findings as to integration were clearly 
erroneous. The court concluded that the lease was an integraled agreement, against which 
parol evidence may not be admitted absent some ambiguity in the terms of the Lease. Id. 
The court, in order to complete the two-part analysis of the parol evidence rule, then 
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addressed the issue of ambiguity although neither party had contended that the provisions of 
the lease agreement were ambiguous. Following the mandate outlined in Hall, supra, the 
court continued: "If the court finds [that] the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence 
maybe admitted only if the court makes a subsequent determination that the language of the 
agreement is ambiguous "Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 180, 
183 (Utah App.,2006). As with the initial inquiry into the question of integration, the court 
noted that some cases have permitted the consideration of any relevant evidence in 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous. Id., See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 
907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). The court held that, if the court then concludes, in light of 
all the credible relevant evidence, that the contract language is indeed ambiguous, parties 
may be allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguities. Id. "Conversely, 
if after considering such evidence, the court determines that the language of the contract is 
not ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of 
the contract." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
The court held that language of the Lease was clear and not "capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies."/*/. ztlS4. See also, Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813P.2dl04,108 (Utah 1991) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Because the Lease is unambiguous, the court of appeals 
held that the trial court improperly allowed Plaintiffs testimony to modify the terms of the 
Lease. Id. 
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The court then concluded that the Plaintiff and Defendant had entered into a valid, 
integrated, and unambiguous lease agreement. Though the trial court could consider extrinsic 
evidence to determine whether the Lease was in fact integrated, the court of appeals held that 
the trial court's implicit finding that the contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous. 
The court held that the presumption favoring a finding of integration was strengthened by the 
presence of a clear and unambiguous integration clause in the Lease. The court held that the 
integration clause weighed heavily in favor of a finding that the agreement of which it is a 
part is integrated. Id. 
B. The Interpretation of the Parol Evidence Rule Employed by the 
Court of Appeals is Well Grounded in Utah Law. 
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah, 1980), the Court 
stated that the standard parol evidence mle is that extraneous evidence may not be used to 
contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument. Id. See also, Youngren v. John W. Lloyd 
Const. Co., 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969); E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. 
v. Broderick, Utah, 522 P.2d 144 (1974); Maine v. Garvin, 16 N.M. 546,417 P.2d 40 (1966); 
Geiger v. Hansen, 214 Kan. 83, 519 P.2d 699 (1974). The Court held that the rule serves a 
useful purpose in appropriate circumstances in safeguarding the integrity of documents. 
However, the Court noted that it should not be applied with any such unreasoning rigidity as 
to defeat what may be shown to be the actual purpose and intent of the parties, but should be 
applied in the light of reason to serve the ends of justice. Id. See also, Youngren v. John W. 
Lloyd Const. Co., supra, note 3, 450 P.2d at 987. 
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The Court in FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., supra, held that the parol 
evidence rule does not preclude proof of agreements as to collateral matters relating to the 
contract or its performance, so long as they are not inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the 
terms of the written agreement. Further, the Court held that the rule does not prevent proof 
that a party did not perform an obligation which it was understood and agreed by the parties 
was a condition precedent to the contract becoming effective. Id. See also, J. &J. Const. Co., 
Inc. v. Mayernik, 241 Or. 537,407 P.2d 625 (1965); Geiger v. Hansen, supra, note 3; Lewis 
v. Roper, 579 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1978); Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.2d 488, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34, 180 
N.E.2d 425 (1962). A good example of this last principle is contained in FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., supra. In that case, the defendant had agreed to lease a corn silo 
and other equipment from the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract for 
failure to pay. The defendant, as a defense, claimed that the silo and equipment were not 
installed prior to harvesting and that agreement constituted a defense. In holding that the 
separate agreement of the parties that the equipment had to be installed at a time certain to 
be of any benefit to the defendant, the Court held that the was an essential to the contract 
becoming effective and whether there was such a separate agreement, not in contradiction 
of the written document, was for the trier of fact to determine. Id. 
The clearest statement of the parol evidence rule and the required review for 
integration is contained in Hall v. Process Instruments and Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024 
(Utah, 1995). The Court noted first that as a principle of contract interpretation, the parol 
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evidence rule has a very narrow application. Id. See also, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985). The Court continued: 
Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating 
causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to 
/ the terms of an integrated contract. Id. (citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's 
^ t^ A ^ ' HosP- 6 3 8 R 2 d l190> 1192 ( U t a h 1 9 8 1 » ; see also Restatement (Second) of 
\ ^ Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981). Under this general rule, "an apparently complete 
and certain agreement which the parties have reduced to writing will be 
conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement." Eie, 638 P.2d at 
1194. Thus, before considering the applicability of the parol evidence rule in 
a contract dispute, the court must first determine that the parties intended the 
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant 
evidence is admissible. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665 (citing Eie, 638 P.2d at 
1194). 
Id. 
As to the second phase of examination of a contract after the issue of integration is 
addressed, the Court noted: 
After the court determines that an agreement is integrated, parol evidence, 
V ^ si although not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms 
of the contract, is admissible to clarify ambiguous terms. Colonial Leasing Co. i \ jt 
v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). *P £ ^ 
Id. 
Summarizing, the Court held: 
The application of the parol evidence rule therefore involves two steps. First, 
the court must determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the court finds 
the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if the 
court makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement is 
ambiguous. 
Id. 
Importantly, the Court acknowledged that an integrated agreement is defined as "a 
writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209 (1981). Id. This Court has accordingly held that 
whenever a litigant insists that a writing is an integration and requests application of the parol 
evidence rule, the court must determine whether the parties adopted a particular writing or 
writings "as the final and complete expression of their bargain." Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194 
(emphasis added). 
It must be noted that this Court in Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665 established a 
rebuttable presumption of integration: " 'Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing 
16 
which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete 
agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence 
that the writing did not constitute a final expression.' " (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, §209(3) (1981)). 
In Hall v. Process Instruments and Control Inc., 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah,1995), this 
Court held that the court of appeals did not error because it correctly recognized that when 
a court is asked to apply the parol evidence rule, it must first determine whether the 
agreement is integrated. Hall 866 P.2d at 606 (citing Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 
547, 551 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). "If a contract is determined to be integrated, the parol 
evidence rule 'excludes evidence of terms in addition to those found in the agreement.' " Id. 
(quoting Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194 and citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(2) 
(1981)). Then, this Court found that the court of appeals addressed the issue of ambiguity, 
indicating that if a contract is found to be integrated and the terms are unambiguous, then 
parol evidence is generally not admissible to explain the parties' intent. Id. 
Finally, as to the evidentiary value of an integration or merger clause, such as is 
contained in the Lease that was signed by the parties on two separate occasions, the law 
seems to be clear. As noted by the court in Ritter v. Grady Automotive Group, Inc., — So.2d 
— , 2007 WL 1454458 (Ala.,2007): 
A merger clause creates "a presumption that the writing represents an 
integrated, that is, the final and complete, agreement of the parties." Ex parte 
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tif*^ 
Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 798 So.2d 656, 660 (Ala.2001). A merger clause 
invokes the parol evidence rule, which precludes a court from considering 
extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements in order to 
"change, alter, or contradict" the terms of the integrated contract. Id. 
The court in Countty Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 
(Idaho,2006), held that 'The merger clause is not merely a factor to consider in deciding 
whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the agreement is integrated." Howard v. Perry, 
141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005). 
The Wisconsin court in Peterson v. Cornerstone Property Development, LLC, 294 
Wis.2d 800, 720 N.W.2d 716 (Wis.App.,2006) held that the general rule is that when a 
contract includes an integration clause, evidence of contemporaneous or prior oral 
agreements relating to the same subject matter are not admissible. Matthew v. American 
Family Mitt. Ins. Co., 54 Wis.2d 336, 341-42,195 N.W.2d 611 (1972). In conjunction with 
the parol evidence rule, an integration clause generally bars the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence to 'Vary or contradict the terms of a writing "Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 
Wis.2d 593, 608-09 n. 11, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987). Absent claims of duress, fraud, or 
mutual mistake, integration clauses are given effect. See, e.g., Matthew, 54 Wis.2d at 341 -42, 
195 N.W.2d 611 (giving effect to integration clause). 
As summarized by the federal court interpreting Utah law in MediaNews Group, Inc., 
v. McCarthey, 432 F.Supp.2d 1213 (D.Utah,2006), 
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To apply the parol evidence rule, the court must first determine whether the 
writing was intended by the parties to be integrated. Utah courts apply a 
"rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an 
integrated agreement is what it appears to be." Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665. 
See also Teny's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur 2D, 618 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 1980) 
("Where parties have various claims and obligations to each other, and have 
had a discussion about resolving their disputes which results in a written 
agreement signed by them, it is generally to be assumed that their disputes 
were merged into the written agreement."). 
Id. 
With regard to the issue of ambiguity, this Court stated in Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 
P.3d 600 (Utah,2003), that a lease agreement, like any contract, "is ambiguous if it is capable 
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of'uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies.' " Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 
1991) (quoting Faulkner v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). When 
determining whether a contract term is ambiguous, this Court noted that the fact finder is not 
limited to the contract itself. Id., see also, Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918 (Utah 
2002); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). Relevant, 
extrinsic evidence "of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the [contract]" 
is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract is ambiguous. Id., see 
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also, Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 P3d 287 (Utah 2001). 
C. Recognizing the Law as Pronounced by This Court, the Court of 
Appeals Properly Assessed and Applied the Parol Evidence Rule in 
this Case. 
1. The Fundamental Flaw of the Appellant's Argument 
The Appellant, as it relates to the parol evidence portion of the appeal does not 
contend that the Lease (Addendum, Exhibit "2"): 1) was legally incomplete or deficient in 
the required terms; 2) lacked the required signatures on the two separate occasions, 
approximately one year apart, when it was signed and re-signed; 3) was not integrated or 
meant to be the final expression of the parties on the issues addressed therein; and/or 4) that 
the Lease was ambiguous. Rather, the Appellant contends that the parties had a 
contemporaneous oral agreemenKlthat the Lease was not to become effective until the 
Plaintiff died, at which time the Lease could be used by the Defendant as a defense to claims 
of his siblings for the property in question. The Appellant states: 
The actual terms of the Lease were not at issue herein. The parties intended 
them, as they were in writing, to govern the property interests contained 
therein, conditioned upon the death of Petitioner and the challenge to the 
Respondent's interest thereby by the siblings. Absent these conditions, 
Petitioner never intended for Respondent to take possession of the property. 
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Appellant's Brief at 26. 
There are two ways that the argument of the. Appellant could be made. First, the 
Appellant could argue that the parties had a contemporaneous oral agreement that was to be 
considered a part of the Lease agreement. That oral contemporaneous agreement would be 
that the effective date of the Lease was one other than explicitly included in the Lease 
agreement. Of course, such an argument raises the fundamental concerns for which the parol 
evidence rule was devised. The terms urged by the Appellant are in direct conflict with the 
explicit terms of the written lease. Although the factual scenario surrounding the execution 
of the lease was the subject of conflicting testimony, the Lease Agreement was entered into 
evidence at trial without an objection. 
The lease provides the Defendant with the use of the property from February 24, 
1994 until February 28,2090 (Addendum, Exhibit " 1 , " Paragraph 3). The Appellant would 
have to contend that the parties had a contemporaneous oral agreement that the effective date 
of the lease was not February 24, 1994, as explicitly contained on the face of the document 
drafted by the Appellant's lawyers; rather, the effective date was an undefined date-the date 
of the Plaintiffs death. Such an argument converts the Lease into a testamentary document 
and clearly contradicts a clear and explicit term of the Lease and thus is thus violative of the 
parol evidence rule. As previously discussed, the Court in FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen 
Dairy, Inc., supra, held that the parol evidence rule does not preclude proof of agreements 
as to collateral matters relating to the contract or its performance, so long as they are not 
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inconsistent with nor in repudiation of the terms of the written agreement. The 
agreement urged by the Appellant is inconsistent with the clear language of the Lease which 
sets forth in definitive terms, the length and term of the agreement and the date it is to be 
effective. 
The other way the Appellant's argument could be made is to analogize to FMA 
Financial Corp, v, Hansen Dairy, Inc,y supra, where the court found that there was a 
separate agreement between the parties as to when the corn silo and other equipment was to 
be delivered. The problem with the argument is that the delivery date urged in FMA 
Financial Corp,, did not contradict the temis of the written lease agreement. Here the terms 
of the alleged agreement that the Lease was to be effective only on the death of the Plaintiff, 
clearly contradicts and contravenes the explicit language of the lease. 
It is respectfully submitted that contrary to the Appellant's position, the oral 
contemporaneous agreement urged by him, falls squarely in the middle of the parol evidence 
matrix rather than constituting a separate oral agreement that does not impinge on the 
interpretation of the terms contained in the Lease. 
2. Relevant Facts Regarding the Preparation and Execution of 
the Lease. 
There are some facts that will aid in reviewing the analysis employed by the court of 
appeals. Of all his children, Richard Tangren testified that the Defendant Rodney Tangren 
was the only child that had showed a significant interest in the ranch and was the one that 
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spent a 'lion's share" of the time at the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 112:14 to 133:7;Tr. Vol. 2, 72:16-
24). 
Before the execution of the lease in question, Rodney Tangren, the 
Defendant/Appellant, was employed by Fencing Incorporated (owned by his father, Richard 
Tangren). The testimony was that Rodney worked on the ranch on his own time and, 
sometimes, worked on the ranch as part of his regular duties for the fencing company. The 
Defendant was paid by the fencing company for normal work hours spent on the ranch 
property (Tr. Vol. 1, 175:23 to 176:2). The detailed testimony revealed that the Defendant 
worked for his father, Richard Tangren the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust, in the fencing 
business, making S5.00 an hour from 1972 to 1989 ($157.00 dollars a week for twenty 
years), when the Defendant testified that Richard retired. From 1989 until 1993, the 
Defendant ran his own fencing company and paid his father a weekly check. In 1993, the 
Defendant found a buyer for the assets of his father's fencing company and arranged the sale, 
from which he received no compensation. From 1993 to the time of the trial, the Defendant 
spent two weeks a month on the ranch each month and received only the income he generated 
from his fencing company (Tr. Vol. 1,193:9 to 195:3; 196:12-15). The Defendant has never 
lived on the ranch and has always maintained his residence in Las Vegas (Tr. Vol. 2,103:8-
13). 
Richard Tangren characterized his relationship with his son, the Defendant Rodney 
Tangen as of 1992, as good. Richard Tangren testified that around 1992, someone was 
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needed to oversee the Tangren ranch and he wanted the Defendant to take the job (Tr. Vol. 
1,51:20-25). However, the Defendant, Rodney Tangren, in order to quit his work in fencing, 
wanted some kind of protection for the time and money he w7as investing in the land (Tr. Vol. 
1, 52:1 -18; Tr. Vol. 2,73:10-15). The Defendant had invested a great deal of time and effort 
in the ranch and used his skills of buying and selling to advance the ranch project (Tr. Vol. 
1, 195:25 to 197:3). In response to the concerns of the Defendant, Richard Tangren, as the 
Trustee of the Plaintiff trust, had an extended term lease (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1, a 96-
year lease), drafted by his attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada, with no input by the Defendant 
(Tr. Vol. 2, 76:10-17). Richard Tangren, the Plaintiff Trustee explicitly questioned his 
attorneys about the need and propriety of the lease as drawn, but after consultation with them, 
decided the lease agreement, as drawn, was the appropriate method to use to frame the 
transaction with the Defendant (Tr. Vol. 1, 52:20 to 53:5; 114:19-24; Exhibit 23). 
In fact, Richard Tangren admitted that he told his attorneys what to put in the lease 
document and entered into the lease voluntarily (Tr. Vol. 1, 114:25 to 115:3; (Tr. Vol. 2, 
76:10 to 77:4; Exhibit 64). Plaintiff acknowledged that the reason the terms were so liberal 
as far as terms and amounts due was because Rodney, the Defendant, was his son (Tr. Vol. 
2, 77:13 to 78:8). Plaintiff acknowledged that the lawyers told him not to extend the terms 
for ninety-nine years and yet, he personally wrote the term into the lease agreement. Further, 
the lawyer advised him against the reduced amount of the payment in the lease and he 
disregarded the advice and inserted the amount of payment in the document (Tr. Vol. 2,85:4 
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to 87:15; Exhibit 23; Addendum No. 1). 
Richard Tangren's testimony was vague and contradictory regarding the execution of 
the lease in 1992 and the changes that occurred to the lease in 1994. Although the 
Defendant's wife, Paula Tangren, was one of the lessees on the 1992 lease (Richard Tangren 
filled in the names on the lease), Richard testified that he unilaterally, at some point in time, 
after the lease was executed, removed her name from the line that preceded the Defendant's 
name, for what he termed "personal reasons." Richard's memory of events was contradictory 
and unclear as to why the attorney placed "husband and wife"' on the lease and who was at 
the signing and how Mrs. Tangren's name was erased and even the date it was executed (Tr. 
Vol. 1, 97:13 to 103:25; 110:1-9; 114:25 to 116:3; Exhibit 23; Addendum No. 1). Richard 
testified that he turned down other offers to lease the property in deference to the lease 
arrangement with the Defendant (Tr. Vol 1, 60:22 to 61:4; 71:14 to 73:11). 
Appellant respectfully submits that if what the parties had intended was a will or 
amendment to the trust to provide for the property to go to the Defendant for ninety-nine 
years upon the Plaintiffs death, the Plaintiff had able bodied attorneys who certainly could 
have accommodated the request. Further, if the Plaintiff had verbalized an intent to have the 
lease effective on his death as opposed to the explicit dates inserted on the lease, certainly 
his lawyers would have raised the issue of the clear conflict in terms with the lease document 
and the fact that he was really creating a testamentary document. Because the lease was 
drafted with a clear start and end date and was re-executed twice, the only logical conclusion 
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is that the Plaintiff never told his lawyers or the Defendant that he wanted the lease to be 
effective upon his death. 
Further, the trial was replete with evidence that the parties comported themselves with 
the lease terms by way of payment and performance and importantly, by the Defendant's 
occupation of the property. 
3. The Court of Appeals Properly Assessed and Applied the 
Parol Evidence Rule to the Facts of this Case. 
After identifying the claims of the parties, the court of appeals started its analysis by 
identifying the same two-part application of the parol evidence rule as identified in this 
Court's holdings: 
The application of the parol evidence rule involves two steps. First, the court 
must consider whether the agreement is integrated. If the court finds [that] the 
agreement is integrated, then parol evidence maybe admitted only if the court 
makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement is ambiguous. 
Hallv. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890 P.2d 1024,1027 (Utah 1995). 
Any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is admissible in the 
preliminary determination of integration. Courts must, however, "apply a 
rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an 
integrated agreement is what it appears to be." Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665. 
Tangren Family Trust ex rei Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 180, 182 (Utah App.,2006). 
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Contrary to the assertion of the Appellant in this case, the court of appeals applied the 
correct analysis and clearly acknowledged that in the determination as to whether the subject 
agreement was integrated, any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, was admissible 
in the preliminary determination of integration. Id. 
The court of appeals, in reviewing the evidence relating to integration that was 
admitted at the trial level, noted the presumption that accompanies what appears to be an 
integrated agreement. 
Though the question of integration is a question of fact for which the trial 
court may consider any relevant evidence, see id., the party challenging the 
application of the parol evidence rule must overcome the presumption that a 
"writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is what it 
appears to be/' Id. The agreement in the instant case includes an integration 
clause titled "Entire Agreement," which states that the Lease contains the 
entire understanding between the parties with respect to the Land and to the 
lessor-lessee relationship. The supreme court has recently reiterated the 
importance and purpose of integration clauses in contracts: [Integration] 
clauses are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to signal to the courts 
that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered completely 
integrated.... [T]he purpose and effect of including [an integration] clause is 
to preclude the subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
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negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets 
the document. Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 bT 70, % 
28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Id at 182-83. 
The court of appeals then summarized the evidence relating to integration as follows: 
Here, the record reflects that Plaintiff worked closely with his attorneys during 
the drafting of the Lease. Plaintiff testified that he went against his attorneys' 
advice in altering some of the terms of the Lease after it was drafted and prior 
to having Defendant sign, including the unusually long term of the Lease and 
the low monthly rental payment schedule. In both the 1992 lease and the 1994 
lease, Plaintiff included the same integration clause. At trial, Plaintiff 
testified that he intended the Lease to become effective only to protect 
Defendant from his siblings in the event of Plaintiffs death. This 
testimony is the sole evidence on which the trial court could have based its 
ruling that the Lease was invalid. Utah law has a stated preference for 
gleaning the intent of contracting parties, "whenever possible, from 
written documents rather than from self-serving testimony." Glauser 
Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, f 20, 27 P.3d 565; see also 
Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, f 9, 977 P.2d 550. Plaintiff has not 
overcome the presumption of integration. See Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 
28 
665. The lease in question contains a clear and unambiguous integration 
clause, the purpose of which is to "preclude the subsequent introduction 
of evidence of preliminary negotiations or of side agreements." Ford, 2004 
UT 70 at f 28,98 P.3d 15 (quotations and citation omitted). While the trial 
court could consider Plaintiffs testimony regarding his intent in creating 
the Lease, the court erred in relying on that testimony in the face of a 
clear and unambiguous integration clause in the Lease itself. See 
Cantamar, 2006 UT App 321 at f 11,142 P.3d 140. We therefore hold that 
the trial court's findings as to integration were clearly erroneous. The 
Lease is an integrated agreement, against which parol evidence may not 
be admitted absent some ambiguity in the terms of the Lease. See Hall, 
890 P.2d at 1027. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 183, 
It is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals properly reviewed the evidence 
and rightly concluded that the self-serving declarations of the Plaintiff in this case do not 
overcome the presumption of integration that is created by the fact 1) that the Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs lawyers drafted the Lease Agreement without input by the Defendant; 2) that the 
Plaintiff and his lawyers disagreed and then resolved issues surrounding the exact content 
of the Lease including the term thereof; 3) that the Defendant not only had the lease executed 
once, but twice, over a two year period; and 4) that the parties conducted business, by 
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allowing the Defendant's occupancy of the property and by paying and accepting rent, in 
accord with the Lease terms. 
Further, as detailed above, in order for the court to accept the self-serving declarations 
of the Plaintiff that the lease was to be effective only on his death, the court would have been 
required to find that the alleged oral agreement specifically altered an explicitly described 
term of the Lease-specifically, the term thereof 
It is submitted that the court of appeals rightly applied the principles enunciated by 
this Court as it related to the parol evidence rule and appropriately determined that the factual 
finding of the trial court that relied on the self-serving declaration of the Plaintiff was clearly 
erroneous. 
Finally, the court of appeals reviewed the second step of the analysis relating to the 
parol evidence rule, in its examination of the Lease for ambiguity, even though neither of the 
parties had made a claim that any of the terms thereof were ambiguous. Id. 
Despite neither party arguing that the language of the Lease creates any 
ambiguity, we discuss ambiguity in order to complete the two-step analysis 
discussed in Hall... In our case, the proffered extrinsic evidence addresses 
only Plaintiffs subjective reasons for entering into the Lease and does not help 
uncover any ambiguity in the Lease itself. The language of the Lease is clear 
and not "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Winegar v. 
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Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) (quotations and citation 
omitted). Because the Lease is unambiguous, the trial court improperly 
allowed Plaintiffs testimony to modify the terms of the Lease. 
Id. 
It is submitted that the analysis employed by the court of appeals was perfectly in line 
with the pronouncements of this court asa to each tenet of the parol evidence rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons fully discussed above, it is submitted that the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in this matter should be upheld. 
Dated this (J. day of July, 2007. 
Matthew P. Jube, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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j - h ^ Z 3 Feet 32.00 Check w ' " 
zVf LOUISE C JONES, Recorder Filed By LCJ 
For RODNEY TANGREN 
_ SflN JUflN COUNTY CORPORATION 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
L e a s e Agreemen t ( " L e a s e " o r "Aareement" ) made on yjtyo „ o?fy 
19? ¥, by a n ^ b e t w e e n . | \ \ cAt\&SA ^ , / CCA^A /~e-*-f T r u s t e e of 
( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d "Lessor 1 1 ) 
and* [ and - fp)o')ruz*?'~> / 6l*lGS~QL C^ , <irasfcand -a*td-
*f4&*~ ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d " L e s s e e " ) . 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
T h a t f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e sum o f One Hundred 
DOLLARS ( $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 ) , t h e r e c e i p t and s u f f i c i e n c y of w h i c h i s 
a c k n o w l e d g e d , L e s s o r and L e s s e e h e r e b y a g r e e t h a t L e s s o r s h a l l 
l e a s e t o L e s s e e , and L e s s e e s h a l l l e a s e from L e s s o r t h e r e a l 
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n b e l o w , upon and s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s , 
c o n d i t i o n s and c o v e n a n t s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
1* The P r o p e r t y : L e s s o r h e r e b y l e a s e s t o L e s s e e and 
L e s s e e h e r e b y l e a s e s from L e s s o r , t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y i n c l u d i n g a l l 
i m p r o v e m e n t s t h e r e o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r c o l l e c t i v e l y c a l l e d t h e 
" P r o p e r t y " ) l o c a t e d i n San J u a n County , U t a h , w h i c h p r o p e r t y i s 
more f u l l y d e s c r i b e d on E x h i b i t A and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by 
r e f e r e n c e . 
L e s s e e h e r e b y a g r e e s t o and s h a l l a c c e p t t h e P r o p e r t y AS IS 
AND WHERE I S , WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND OR NATURE 
WHATSOEVER. E x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d h e r e i n , 
L e s s e e s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o pay t h e e x p e n s e s of e v e r y k i n d and 
n a t u r e w h a t s o e v e r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g t h e P r o p e r t y , 
including, without limitation, all repairs, maintenance and the 
like of every 3tind and nature whatsoever with respect to the 
Property, heat, light, power, water, sewage, telephone and any 
and all other public service and utility costs used in or on said 
property during the* term of this Lease or any renewal thereof, 
and all other expenses which may be incurred by Lessee, from the 
time of possession or the commencement date, whichever is 
earlier• it is the intention- of this paragraph to provide that 
Lessor shall have no responsibility or obligation for expenses 
with respect to the care or maintenance of the Property 
regardless of the nature of the expense, or the fact that the 
condition resulting in the expense may have preceded the Lessee's 
possession or the commencement date, whichever is earlier, 
unless otherwise specifically provided herein. 
2. Compliance with Laws and Ttecrulation: Lessee shall 
comply fully with all laws, regulations, rules and orders of any 
government or governmental agency that may apply to this Lease, 
to its performance and to the possession, occupancy and use of 
the Property. 
3. Duration of Lee^ se: The term of this Lease shall 
commence on /^PJ&u&i / , 19 9 2^ , or upon delivery of possession, 
whichever occurs first, and unless it comes to an end sooner by 
operation of the provisions contained herein or by operation of 
law, shall continue for a term which shall terminate on the 
occurrence of a default by Lessee or on jV , 2090. 
2 
4. possession: Lessor and Lessee acknowledge that Lessee 
is currently in possession of the Property and shall continue in 
possession hereafter pursuant to this Agreement• 
5. Rental: Lessee shall pay to Lessor a monthly rent of 
($ /-iT£)' OO) due and payable on the 1st day 
of each calendar month (the "Due Date") beginning with the 
^P^^g^c^-7 rental payment. In addition each month on 
the same date Lessee shall pay one-twelfth (1/12) of the 
estimated annual taxes and insurance for the then current 
calendar year. For example in Jl.991 th& estimated annual 
insurance cost is $ ^ Q 6 ^ Q and the estimated cost for real 
property taxes is $ ftS'OittO During calendar year 1992 each 
monthly payment to Lessor will include an amount equal to the sum 
of one-twelfth (1/12) of each of these estimated annual costs/ or 
in 199> the sum of $_ f 2jlT.^ monthly. Thus in 1992 each monthly 
payment made to Lessor shall be $ £ %S ^ ^ being the sum of the 
monthly rent and one-twelfth (1/12) of each of the estimated 
annual costs. 
All payments shall be made to Lessor at 3//$t jtr &izJ^ 
/^ys^lfzqc^ "V^o „
 o r where subsequently directed. 
6. Payment Increases: Ten days prior to January 1, of 
each calendar year or as soon thereafter as the estimated annual 
costs for taxes and insurance can be ascertained, Lessor shall 
provide to Lessee the calculated sum to be paid monthly for said 
costs in addition to the $^  per month rental payment. 
Upon notice Lessee shall increase or decrease the total monthly 
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payment beginning with the first payment due subsequent to the 
notice. If Lessor fails to provide such notice then the monthly 
payment shall continue in the amount paid in the previous 
calendar year until such notice is provided. Any special taxes 
or assessment which become due during the term hereof shall be 
paid by Lessee upon demand by Lessor. 
7. Taxes. Insurance, to be Paid: Lessor shall be 
responsible for paying out of the monthly estimated sum received 
from Lessee pursuant to paragraph 5 all real property tax 
assessed against the Property during the term of the Lease and 
the insurance. 
8. Utilities: Lessee shall be responsible for and shall 
pay directly to the suppliers all charges for electricity, 
sewage, gas and all other utilities and services used on or in 
connection with the Property during the term of this Lease and 
during any period of occupancy of the Property before or after 
such term. 
9. Events of Default: In any one or more of the following 
cases, or in any one or more of the cases that elsewhere in this 
Lease may be made subject to this provision, lessor shall have 
just cause to do so and may declare Lessee in default if Lessee: 
(a) neglects to timely perform any of its payments or 
other obligations under this Lease; 
(b) whether voluntarily or involuntarily, becomes 
unable to meet its financial obligations as they 
mature; 
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(c) becomes insolvent; or 
(d) vacates the property and leaves it vacant for a 
period in excess of thirty days without prior 
approval from Lessor* 
10. Termination of Lease Upon Default: In the event of a 
default as described in Section 9 above, Lessor may elect to 
terminate this Lease upon ten (10) days notice to Lessee and to 
demand and to receive the immediate surrender of the Property as 
well as the immediate payment of all amounts then due from Lessee 
to Lessor by law and under this Lease, without prejudice to all 
such other rights and remedies as may exist by law under this 
Lease, but reserving to Lessee the benefits of Section 11 below 
in a case where they apply. 
11. Lessee*s Cure of Default: Without prejudice to the 
provisions of this Lease regarding rights and remedies and the 
resolution of claims, controversies, demands or disputes and 
without limiting the concurrent availability of all such 
provisions to Lessor, if Lessor seeks to terminate this Lease 
upon a default in the payment of rent, taxes or other sum payable 
under this Lease or upon any other default which Lessee 
reasonably and promptly can correct, Lessor shall give Lessee ten 
(10) days notice to correct such default, and such notice shall 
not take effect at the end of such ten (10) days if Lessee 
corrects the default in the interim. 
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12. Assignment by Lessee: This Lease is personal to 
Lessee, and Lessee does — have the right to assign or transfer 
this Lease. 
13. Assignment by Lessojr: This Lease or the payments due 
Lessor hereunder may be assigned. Lessor has the right to set up 
a collection account and Lessee upon notice agrees to make all 
subsequent payments to such collection account as directed. 
14. Governing Law: The law applicable to the performance 
of this Lease shall be the law of the State of Utah. 
15. Notice of Lease: Lessee may record this Lease, or upon 
the request of Lessee, Lessor shall prepare and execute a Notice 
of Lease which Lessee may record at its expense. Lessee shall 
deliver a copy of any such recorded Notice of Lease to Lessor. 
16 • No Other Assurances: Lessee makes this Lease in 
reliance upon its provisions, including any amendments, 
supplements and extensions, and not in reliance upon any alleged 
assurances, representations and warranties made by Lessor, or 
Lessor's agents, servants or employees. 
17. .Entire Agreement: This Lease contains the entire 
understanding between the parties with respect to its subject-
matter, the Property and all aspects of the relationship between 
Lessee and Lessor. 
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 • Amendments in Writing: No alleged modification, 
termination or waiver of this Lease shall be binding unless it is 
set out in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
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19, Notices: Where this Lease requires notice to be 
given, except where it expressly provides to the contrary, all 
such notices shall be in writing and (except for those that are 
delivered by hand) shall be deemed given when mailed by 
registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or when sent by 
telegram or cable, addressed to the party or Guarantor entitled 
to receive the notice at his or its address as provided for such 
purpose in this Lease or at such other address as the party or 
Guarantor to receive the notice last may have designated for such 
purpose by notice given to the other party. 
20. Addresses for Notices: The addresses for notices and 
payments are: 
LESSOR: 
LESSEE: 
3^^ £ CW/w-K. UK/4, 
21. Attorney Fees: In the event it becomes necessary for 
any party to employ an attorney to enforce the terms of this 
Agreement or protect his rights, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred 
thereby, 
22. Brokers: Each party represents to the other that it 
has not utilized the services of any real estate broker in 
connection herewith. In the event any claims or demands arise as 
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a result of the making of this Lease, each part., hereto covenants 
and agrees to indemnify the other against any claims or demands 
with respect to the making of this Lease allegedly resulting from 
arrangements or contracts made by the indemnifying party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
as of the date first above written. 
LESSEE: LESSOR: 
£#V^C^ 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
) 
COUNTY OF CLARK ) 
On 
s s : 
ffe t h i s & Y ^ d a y of f<P&. 
personally appeared before me, a Notary Public 
/ , who acknowl 
foregoing Lease Agreement. 
IM, 
, j?W 
7?/ .<T, UWf-XfiJ 
that "/fee j executed the 
STATE OF NEVADA ) 
) 
COUNTY OF CLARK ) 
s s : 
2 ^ 
JOT; 
3 ^ NOTARY PUBLlCnj 
iSTATE OF NEVADA l 
/ County of Clark S 
Patricia Crickonberoer 1 
nmSnt Exoiret Dec azj foggj l 
On this Jlv^ day of ^~, ^ ^ ..
 itmt x -n r , 
p e r s o n a l l y appea red b e f o r e me, a^Notary^Publ^ic,~~ft\cjjfi#f) . J)M\j£tfc6As/ 
, who acknowledged tjo me t h \ t stre^^xje^roited t h e 
f o r e g o i n g Lease Agreement. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
i NOTARY PUBI IC" 
STATE OF NEVADA 
^p^foumy of Clarfc . 
EXHIBIT A 
VALUE 
1. An undivided interest in land and improvements 
located 18 miles Southwest of Moab, Utah, on the 
Colorado River, consisting of 135 acres and water 
rights to irrigate 39.5 acres; the legal 
description of which is the following: 
Parcel 1: All that certain lot, piece 
and parcel of land lying situate and 
being in San Juan County and known as the 
NE 1/4 NE 1/4, Section 12, T. 27 S., R. 
20 E., S. L. B« & M. , Utah, containing 40 
acres, more or less. 
Parcel 2: All that certain lot, piece 
and parcel of land lying situate and 
being in San Juan County and being 
described as follows: E 1/2 of the S£ 
1/4 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 NE 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 
1, T. 27 S., R. 20 E., S. L. B. & M., 
Utah. Lots 11 and 12, Section 6; Lot 2, 
Section 7; T. 27 S., R. 21 E., S. L. B. & 
M,, Township 37 South, Range 19 East, S. 
L. B. & M., Section 16: San Juan 
County. 
$399,033. 
'/ -37J jo£> /£ case 
